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Summary
We study sequential and single-round uniform-price auctions with affiliated values. We
derive symmetric equilibrium for the auction in which k1 objects are sold in the first
round and k2 in the second round, with and without revelation of the first-round
winning bids. We demonstrate that auctioning objects in sequence generates a
lowballing effect that reduces first-round revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-
round, uniform auction for k = k1 + k2 objects than in a sequential uniform auction with
no bid announcement. When the first-round winning bids are announced, we also
identify two informational effects: a positive effect on second-round price and an
ambiguous effect on first-round price. The expected first-round price can be greater or
smaller than with no bid announcement, and greater or smaller than the expected price
in a single-round uniform auction. As a result, total expected revenue in a sequential
uniform auction with winning-bids announcement can be greater or smaller than in a
single-round uniform auction.
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1    Introduction
Uniform-price auctions are widely used to sell identical or quite similar objects. Sometimes
sellers auction all objects together in a single round, while other times they auction them
separately in a sequence of rounds. For example, cattle, fish, vegetables, timber, tobacco,
wine, and frequency transmission rights typically are  sold  in sequence,  while governmentsecurities and mineral rights are sold in a single round. When using sequential auctions, the
seller must decide what information to release after each round of bidding.
Two important questions arise. Do sequential sales raise the seller’s revenue, or is revenue
maximized in a single-round auction? How do equilibrium prices in each round of a sequential
auction depend on the information that the seller reveals about bidding in earlier rounds?
To address these questions, we suppose that the seller owns k identical objects. Each
buyer demands only one object.1 Buyers’ value estimates, or signals, are aﬃliated random
variables, as in Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000). We compare the single-round uniform-price
auction and the two-round (or sequential) uniform-price auction, in which k1 objects are sold
in the ﬁrst round and k2 = k−k1 are sold in the second round. In both auctions, the price in
a given round is equal to the highest losing bid in that round. (The extension of our results
to more than two rounds is discussed in Section 4.) For sequential auctions, we focus on two
information policies. Under the ﬁrst policy, the seller does not reveal any information after
the ﬁrst round. Under the second policy, the seller announces all the ﬁrst-round winning bids
before the second round. As we shall see in Section 5.2, intermediate information policies
like the policy of revealing only the lowest ﬁrst-round winning bid - an approximation of
the policy of revealing the winning price - yield the seller a lower revenue than the policy of
revealing all winning bids.
First, we derive symmetric equilibrium bidding strategies. While equilibrium bidding
strategies and seller’s revenue in the single-round uniform auction are well known (e.g., see
Milgrom and Weber, 2000), we are the ﬁrst to study and provide an equilibrium for the
sequential, uniform-price auction with winning-bids announcement.
The equilibrium of the sequential auction with no bid announcement (when only one
object is sold in each round) was conjectured by Milgrom and Weber (2000), ﬁrst circulated
as a working paper in 1982. In a forward and bracketed comments, Milgrom and Weber
(2000) explain that the delay in publishing their work was due to the proofs of this and other
related results having “refused to come together” (p.179). They also explain the nature of
1Government-run auctions often limit each bidder to bid for at most one asset. This has been the case,
for example, in the auctions of national frequency licenses in many European countries in the last few years.
2the diﬃculty, to which we return in Section 4, and add that the conjectured equilibrium
“should be regarded as being in doubt” (p.188). We have been able to prove (for the case
of two rounds) that the equilibrium conjectured by Milgrom and Weber (extended to more
than just one object per round) is indeed an equilibrium.
According to the linkage principle, public revelation of information raises revenue in the
single-item, single-round, symmetric, aﬃliated-values model (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982).
Even if the winning bids are not announced, bidders have additional knowledge after the
ﬁrst round of a sequential auction. They know that at least k1 bidders bid higher than
them. Intuition derived from the linkage principle has lead Milgrom and Weber’s (2000) to
conjecture that both versions of the sequential auction raise greater revenue than a single-
round auction for k objects (see also fn.5). We show that this conjecture is incorrect.
In the symmetric equilibrium of a sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement,
the new information available to bidders after the ﬁrst round turns out to be useless. In
the second round, the bidding function is as in a single-round uniform auction for k objects,
because in the symmetric equilibrium of a single-round uniform auction bidders bid as if they
are tied with the k-th highest bid; that is, they already assume that there are k − 1 ≥ k1
bidders with signals higher than theirs. Auctioning objects in sequence, however, has a
cost to the seller. It induces bidders to lowball in the ﬁrst round by making bids that are
conditional on being tied with the price setter. This lowballing eﬀect reduces ﬁrst-round
revenue. Thus, revenue is greater in a single-round auction than in a sequential auction with
no bid announcement.
While we are not the ﬁrst to show that the linkage principle may not hold in multi-unit
auctions, we must stress a very important diﬀerence with other examples in the literature
that contradict the linkage principle. In all the other examples we are aware of (e.g., see Perry
and Reny, 1999, and example 8.2 in Krishna, 2002) either bidders have multi-unit demands,
or they are asymmetric; the linkage principle fails because public revelation of information
changes the ﬁnal allocation of the goods. In our model bidders are symmetric, they have unit
demands, and both the single-round and the sequential auction are eﬃcient - the winners are
the bidders with the k highest signals. The linkage principle fails because in the sequential
3uniform auction with no bid announcement all bidders lowball in the ﬁrst round.
In our model, when the ﬁrst-round winning bids are announced, there is a positive infor-
mational eﬀect on second-round bids. This eﬀect is closely related to the linkage principle.
H o w e v e r ,t h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrst-round winning bids will be revealed also has an eﬀect on ﬁrst-
round bids, which may raise or decrease ﬁrst-round revenue, depending on the model parame-
ters. The ﬁrst-round price when the winning bids are announced could be greater or smaller
than with no bid announcement, and greater or smaller than the price in a single-round
auction. As a result, total revenue in a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement
could be greater or smaller than in a single-round auction.
Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000) have shown that the ascending (English) auction raises
the highest revenue among standard single-round auctions, and that the symmetric equilib-
rium of the sequential ascending auction coincides with the symmetric equilibrium of the
single-round ascending auction. As an ascending auction moves forward and bidders drop
out, the losers’ (i.e., the lowest) signals become known. In a sequential auction with winning-
bids announcement, it is the winners’ (i.e., the highest) signals that are revealed after each
round. When there are three bidders and two objects, the single-round uniform-price auction
is equivalent to an ascending auction. Thus, our revenue ranking results imply that, for
some model parameters, a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement yields higher
revenue than any standard single-round auction.
While there are many papers on sequential auctions with bidders having independent
private values (see Klemperer, 1999, and Krishna, 2002, for surveys), sequential auctions
with aﬃliated values have been little studied. Two papers somewhat connected to our work
are Ortega Reichert (1968) and Hausch (1986). In both papers, bidders demand more than
one object. Ortega Reichert (1968) studies a two-bidder, two-period, sequential ﬁrst-price
auction with positive correlation of bidders’ valuations across periods and across bidders. He
shows that there is a deception eﬀect. Compared to a one-shot auction, bidders reduce their
ﬁr s t - r o u n db i d st oi n d u c er i v a l st oh o l dm o r ep e s s i m i s t i cb e l i e f sa b o u tt h e i rv a l u a t i o n sf o rt h e
second object. Hausch (1986) studies a special discrete case of a two-bidder, two-unit demand,
two-signal, two-period, common-value, sequential ﬁrst-price auction in which both the losing
4and the winning bids are announced after the ﬁrst round. Besides the deception eﬀect, he
shows that there is an opposite informational eﬀect that raises the seller’s revenue. In our
model bidders have unit-demand, so there is no deception eﬀect; with no bid announcement
ﬁrst-round bids are lower because bidders condition on being tied with the price setter, not
because they want to deceive their opponents. Furthermore, when the seller reveals the ﬁrst-
round winning bids, there are informational eﬀects on both ﬁrst and second-round bidding.
We introduce the model in the next section. Section 3 studies the symmetric equilibria
of the sequential auction with and without winning-bids announcement. Section 4 contains
the proofs of the theorems reported in Section 3 and discusses extensions to more than two
rounds. Section 5 compares the price sequences and revenues in the sequential and single-
round auctions. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider the standard aﬃliated-value model of Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000). A seller
owns k identical objects. There are n bidders participating in the auction, every bidder
desiring only one object. Before the auction, bidder i, i =1 ,2,...,n, observes the realization
xi of a signal Xi.L e ts1,...,sm be the realizations of additional signals S1,...,Sm unobservable
by the bidders, and denote with w the vector of signal realizations (s1,...,s m,x 1,...,xn).L e t
w ∨ w0 b et h ec o m p o n e n t - w i s em a x i m u ma n dw ∧ w0 be the component-wise minimum of w
and w0. Signals are drawn from a distribution with a joint pdf f(w), which is symmetric in




0) for all w,w
0. (1)
The support of f is [s,s]m × [x,x]n,w i t h−∞ ≤ s < s ≤ +∞,a n d−∞ ≤ x < x ≤ +∞.
The value of one object for bidder i is given by Vi = u(S1,...,S m,X i,{Xj}j6=i),w h e r et h e
function u(·) satisﬁes the following assumption.
Assumption 1. Vi = u(S1,...,Sm,X i,{Xj}j6=i) is non-negative, bounded, continuous, in-
5creasing in each variable, and symmetric in the other bidders’ signals Xj, j 6= i.
We compare two standard auction formats. In a single-round uniform auction (an exten-
sion of the second-price auction introduced by Vickrey, 1961) the seller auctions all objects
simultaneously in a single round. The bidders with the k highest bids win one object each
at a price equal to the (k +1 ) -st highest bid. In a sequential uniform auction,t h es e l l e r
auctions the objects in two rounds, k1 objects in the ﬁrst round and k2 = k − k1 in the
second round. In round t, t =1 ,2, the bidders with the kt highest bids win one object
each at a price equal to the (kt +1 ) -st highest bid. Since bidders have unit demand, only
the n − k1 ﬁrst-round losers participate in the second round. For the sequential auction, we
consider two information policies. According to the ﬁrst policy, the seller does not reveal
any information after the ﬁrst round. This is referred to as the no-bid-announcement policy.
The second policy prescribes that the seller announces the ﬁrst-round winning bids (i.e., the
k1 highest bids), before the second round bids are submitted. This is referred to as the
winning-bids-announcement policy.
3 Symmetric Equilibria
To derive the symmetric equilibrium bidding functions in each of the auction formats, it is
useful to take the point of view of one of the bidders, say bidder 1 with signal X1 = x,a n d
to consider the order statistics associated with the signals of all other bidders. We denote
with Y m the m-th highest signal of bidders 2,3,...,n (i.e., all bidders except bidder 1).






|c1 ≤ Y 1 ≤ d1,...,ck ≤ Y k ≤ dk
¤
is increasing in all its arguments (see
Milgrom and Weber, 1982, Theorem 5). We use this property repeatedly in our proofs; when
we refer to aﬃliation, we refer to this property.
We denote with bs(·) the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the single-round
uniform auction; bn
t (·) and ba
t(·) are the symmetric equilibrium bidding functions in round t,
t =1 ,2, of the sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement and with winning-bids
announcement, respectively.
6We begin by recalling (see Milgrom and Weber, 1982, 2000) that a symmetric equilibrium








Due to aﬃliation and Assumption 1, bs(x) is an increasing function of x.B i d d e r1 bids the
expected value of an object conditional on his own signal, X1 = x, and on his signal being
just high enough to guarantee winning (i.e., being equal to the k-th highest signal among
all other bidders’ signals). This last conditioning can be understood as a winner’s curse
correction due to interdependent values. If values are private, bidders need not condition
their bids on being tied with the price setter.
Theorem 1. A symmetric equilibrium strategy in the sequential uniform auction with no























In an auction with no bid announcement, bids in both rounds depend only on a bidder’s
own signal. In a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement, the second-round bid
must also depend on the ﬁrst-round winning bids. If the ﬁrst-round symmetric-equilibrium
bidding function is increasing (as shown below), announcing the winning bids is equivalent to
announcing the k1 highest signals. Taking the point of view of a bidder who is bidding in the
second round, without loss of generality bidder 1, the announced bids reveal the realizations
y1,...,yk1 of Y 1,...,Y k1,t h ek1 highest signals among bidders 2,...,n.
Theorem 2. Let y1,...,y k1 be the realizations of the signals that correspond to the winning
bids in the ﬁrst round. A symmetric equilibrium strategy in the sequential uniform auction




























T h ep r o o f sa r el e f tt oS e c t i o n4 ;h e r ew ed i s c u s st h eu n d e r l y i n gi n t u i t i o n .
First, note that aﬃliation and Assumption 1 imply that the bidding functions (3), (4),
and (6) are increasing in x, while the bidding function (5) is increasing in x and y1,...,yk1.
Second, observe that the bidding function in the second round of the auction with no bid
announcement (3) coincides with the bidding function in the single-round uniform auction
(2). Intuitively, this makes sense. With no announcement, the only additional information
that bidders have in the second round is that in the ﬁrst round k1 bidders bid higher than
they did. Since the ﬁrst-round bid function is increasing, this implies that the remaining
bidders know that k1 of the signals of the other bidders are higher than their own. Thus, a
bidder bids the expected value of an object conditional on (a) his own signal, (b) the fact
that the k1 ﬁrst-round winners have higher signals, and (c) his own signal being just high
enough to win (i.e., being equal to the (k − k1)-th highest signal of the n−1−k1 remaining
opponents). This is equivalent to saying that a bidder conditions on his own signal and on
his signal being equal to the k-th highest signal of the other n − 1 bidders, which yields the
same equilibrium bidding function as in a single-round uniform auction.
Third, the second-round bidding function for the case in which the ﬁrst-round winning
bids are announced must also condition on the signals revealed by this announcement. In
this case, each remaining bidder bids the expected value of an object conditional on (a) his
own signal, (b) his own signal being just high enough to win (i.e., being equal to the k-th
highest signal of his opponents), and (c) the revealed signal values of the ﬁrst-round winning
bidders.
Finally, in the ﬁrst round of a sequential auction with or without winning-bids announce-
ment, a bidder knows that, if he loses, he will get another chance to win the object; hence,
he does not want to pay more than what he expects to pay in the second round. He bids
8the expected second-round price conditional on his own signal and his own signal being just
high enough to win in the ﬁrst round (i.e., being equal to the k1-th highest signal of the
opponents). The second-round price is the second-round bid of the opponent with the k-th
highest signal: bn
2(Y k) in an auction with no bid announcement and ba
2
¡
Y k;Y 1,...,Y k1¢
in an
auction with winning-bids announcement.
4 P r o o f so fT h e o r e m s1a n d2
Although the proofs are an important contribution of this paper, this section can be skipped
by the reader who is only interested in the properties and comparisons of the diﬀerent auction
formats. We ﬁrst prove Theorem 2. This proof is simpler and allows us to highlight the
diﬃculties in the proof of Theorem 1. We will conclude this section with a remark about
extending Theorems 1 and 2 to more than two rounds of bidding.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 .Assume that all bidders other than bidder 1 use the bidding functions
ba
1(·) and ba
2(·). We need to show that bidder 1 also wants to use them. Suppose, to the
contrary, that bidder 1 observes signal x and bids β1 in the ﬁrst round. Moreover, if he
does not win in the ﬁrst round, the signals y1,...,yk1 corresponding to the k1 highest bids
in the ﬁrst round are revealed, and bidder 1 bids β2(y1,...,yk1) in the second round. Bidder




1) is equivalent to bidding min(ba
1) - in this case bidder 1 never wins -
while bidding above max(ba
1) is equivalent to bidding max(ba
1) - in this case bidder 1 always







= β2(y1,...,yk1); that is, we can think that
bidder 1 uses the same bidding functions as all other bidders, but in the ﬁrst round he bids















Suppose that bidder 1 does not win an object in the ﬁrst-round. Then, using (8), if he bids
as if his signal were σ2 in the second round, his expected proﬁt conditional on X1 = x and



















where h(yk|x;y1,..,yk1)is the density of Y k conditional on X1 = x, Y 1 = y1,...,Y k1 = yk1.
Aﬃliation and Assumption 1 imply that v2(x;y1,...,yk1;yk) is increasing in x,s ot h ed i ﬀerence
v2(x;y1,...,yk1;yk)−v2(yk;y1,...,y k1;yk) has the same sign as x−yk. Hence bidder 1’s expected
second-round proﬁt is maximized by setting σ2 = x, and bidder 1’s optimal bid in the second
round is ba
2(x;y1,...,y k1). This establishes that, no matter what he bid in the ﬁr s tr o u n d ,i ti s
optimal for bidder 1 to bid according to the equilibrium bidding function ba
2(·) in the second
round.
Next, we show that it is also optimal to bid according to ba
1(·) in the ﬁrst round. We need























































10Bidder 1’s total expected proﬁt at the beginning of the ﬁrst round can be decomposed in
two parts: the expected proﬁtf r o mt h eﬁrst round and the expected proﬁt from the second
round. Using (9), (10), (11), and recalling that in the ﬁrst round bidder 1 bids as if his signal
were σ1 and in the second round he bids according to his true signal x, the expected proﬁt






























































where h(y1,...,yk1|x) is the joint density of Y 1,...,Yk1 conditional on X1 = x; h(y1,...,yk1,y k|x)
is the joint density of Y 1,...,Y k1,Yk conditional on X1 = x; h(y1,..,yk1−1|x;yk1,y k) is the
joint density of Y 1,...,Y k1−1 conditional on X1 = x, Y k1 = yk1,a n dY k = yk; h(yk1,y k|x)
is the joint density of Y k1 and Y k conditional on X1 = x. Hence, bidder 1’s total expected


































































To prove that Πa(x;σ1) is maximized at σ1 = x, we will show that
∂Πa(x;σ1)
∂σ1 has the same
sign as (x − σ1). The second term in (12) is zero for σ1 <x(by deﬁnition, Y k1 ≥ Y k and










































































h(σ1,y k|x)dyk ≤ 0,
where the ﬁrst equality follows from (10) and (11), the second equality follows from (8), and
the inequality follows from aﬃliation and yk ≥ x.
























































12Because of aﬃliation, this diﬀerence has the same sign as (x−σ1). Hence
∂Πa(x;σ1)
∂σ1 is positive
for σ1 <xand negative for σ1 >x . Therefore, the expected proﬁto fb i d d e r1 is maximized
at σ1 = x. This implies that bidder 1’s optimal bid in the ﬁrst round is ba
1(x) and concludes
the proof.
There are two steps in the proof of Theorem 2. Assuming that all other bidders follow the
bidding functions ba
1(·) and ba
2(·), ﬁrst we show that, no matter what bidder 1 did in the ﬁrst
round, in the second round it is optimal for him to bid according to ba
2(·). Then we show that
in the ﬁrst round it is optimal to follow ba
1(·). This method of proof does not fully generalize
to the case of no bid announcement. In this case, it is optimal for bidder 1 with signal x to
bid according to bn
2(x) in the second round if and only if he has bid according to bn
1(x),o r
lower, in the ﬁrst round. On the contrary, if bidder 1 has bid higher than bn
1(x) in the ﬁrst
round and lost, he will want to bid higher than bn
2(x) in the second round. This, in turn,
makes it diﬃcult to show that it is optimal to bid according to bn
1(x) in the ﬁrst round. As
Milgrom and Weber (2000, p.182) point out, the diﬃculty in proving equilibrium existence
in this case is in ruling out that “a bidder might choose to bid a bit higher in the ﬁrst round
in order to have a better estimate of the winning bid, should he lose.” Our proof of Theorem
1o v e r c o m e st h i sd i ﬃculty by using the following lemma, proven in Appendix A.
Lemma 1. Let D(s) be a continuous function deﬁned on [0,S].L e ta(s) be a non-decreasing
positive function, deﬁned on [0,S].I f
R x
0 D(s)a(s)ds ≤ 0 for all x ∈ [0,S],t h e n
R z
0 D(s)ds ≤ 0
for all z ∈ [0,S].
Proof of Theorem 1. We begin as in the proof of Theorem 2, by assuming that all bidders
other than bidder 1 use the bidding functions bn
1(·) and bn
2(·) given by (4) and (3). We want
to show that it is also optimal for bidder 1 to use them. Suppose, to the contrary, that bidder
1 observes signal x and bids β1 in the ﬁrst round and β2 in the second round. As in the proof
of Theorem 2, we can deﬁne σ1 and σ2 such that bn
1(σ1)=β1 and bn
2(σ2)=β2.
We begin by showing that if bidder 1 bids less than or equal to bn
1(x) in the ﬁrst round
(i.e., σ1 ≤ x), then his optimal bid in the second round is bn
2(x) (i.e., σ2 = x maximizes his
expected second round proﬁt).
13If bidder 1 does not win an object in the ﬁrst round, he knows that yk1 > σ1.T h e nh i s
















x h(e yk1,e yk|x)de ykde yk1
dykdyk1, (13)
where v1(·) is given by (10) and h(yk1,y k|x)is the joint density of Y k1 and Y k conditional on
X1 = x.2 Diﬀerentiating πn















x h(e yk1,e yk|x)de ykde yk1
dyk1,












x h(e yk1,e yk|x)de ykde yk1
.
W en o ws h o wt h a t ,w h e nσ1 ≤ x,
∂πn
2(x;σ1,σ2)
∂σ2 has the same sign as (x − σ2).
First, consider σ2 >x .T h e n
E[V1|X1 = x,Y
k1 ≥ σ1,Y
k = σ2]=E[V1|X1 = x,Y
k = σ2] ≤ E[V1|X1 = σ2,Y
k = σ2],
where the equality follows from σ2 >x≥ σ1 and Y k1 ≥ Y k, and the inequality follows from
aﬃliation and Assumption 1. We conclude that
∂πn
2(x;σ1,σ2)
∂σ2 is negative for σ2 >x .
Second, consider σ2 <x . Then, by aﬃliation and Assumption 1,
E[V1|X1 = x,Y
k1 ≥ σ1,Y
k = σ2] ≥ E[V1|X1 = x,Y





∂σ2 is positive in this case. Thus, if bidder 1 bids less than or equal to bn
1(x) in the
ﬁrst round (σ1 ≤ x), his optimal bid in the second round is bn
2(x).
W ec o m p l e t et h ep r o o fb ys h o w i n gt h a ti ti so p t i m a lf o rb i d d e r1 to bid bn
1(x) in the ﬁrst
2Note that the second-round proﬁt depends on σ1, contrary to the case in which the winning bids are
announced, see equation (9).
14round (i.e., to bid as if σ1 = x). Let σ∗
2(σ1) be the value of σ2 that maximizes πn
2 (x;σ1,σ2);
we have already shown that σ∗
2(σ1)=x for σ1 ≤ x. Using (10), bidder 1’s total expected

























where the second term follows from (13). Diﬀerentiating with respect to σ1 and applying the




















































´ h(σ1,y k|x) R σ1


























By aﬃl i a t i o n ,t h i st e r mh a st h es a m es i g na s(x − σ1).
We now show that the second term in (14) is non-negative for σ1 <xand non-positive
for σ1 >x .A sar e s u l t ,
∂Πn(x;σ1)
∂σ1 has the same sign as (x − σ1), which implies that σ1 = x
maximizes Πn(x;σ1); that is, the optimal bid of bidder 1 in the ﬁrst round is bn
1(x). This will
conclude the proof. First, observe that if σ∗
2(σ1) ≥ σ1 then the second term in (14) is zero,
since, by deﬁnition, h(σ1,y k|x)=0for yk > σ1. Therefore, since σ∗
2(σ1)=x for σ1 ≤ x,t h e
second term in (14) is zero for σ1 ≤ x.
15It remains to show that in the case σ1 >xand σ∗
2(σ1) < σ1 the second term in (14) is











and note that, by aﬃliation, the second term in (14) is smaller than
R σ1
σ∗
2(σ1) D(yk)dyk.T h e n














































h(yk1,y k|x)dyk1dyk ≤ 0. (18)




















D(yk)a(yk)dyk ≤ 0 for all σ2. (19)
3This is precisely where lies the diﬃculty mentioned by Milgrom and Weber (2000). We need to show
that in the ﬁrst round bidder 1 does not want to bid as if his signal were higher than x.
16Note that a(yk), given by (17), is positive and increasing (by aﬃliation). Then, by Lemma 1,
equation (19) implies that
R z
σ∗
2(σ1) D(yk)dyk ≤ 0 for all z ≥ σ∗




0, so (16) holds. Thus, the second term in (14) is negative, which concludes the proof.
REMARK. Theorem 2 and its proof readily generalize to the case of any ﬁnite number of
rounds. Suppose that there are T rounds of bidding and kt objects are sold in round t.L e t
mt =
Pt
τ=1 kτ. Then, in the last round the symmetric equilibrium bidding function of the
































In the case of no bid announcement, this extension presents a technical diﬃculty, as it is not
clear how to generalize the proof of Theorem 1.
5 Properties of Sequential Auctions
This section establishes the properties and compares the equilibrium bidding strategies of the
single-round and the sequential uniform auctions with and without winning-bids announce-
ment. It is now convenient to take the point of view of the seller, or of an outside observer,
and consider the order statistics of the signals of all n bidders. Denote with Zm the m-th
highest signal among all n bidders. It is important to observe that, because of the symmetry
of signals, conditioning on the event {Zm+1 = x} is equivalent to conditioning on the event
{X1 ≥ x,Y m = x},o ro nt h ee v e n t{Y m ≥ X1 = x ≥ Y m+1}.T h ee v e n tt h a tt h e(m +1 ) -st
highest signal is x is equivalent to the event that one bidder, without loss of generality bidder
1, has a signal higher than or equal to x,a n dt h em-th highest signal among all other bidders’
17signals is x.I ti sa l s oe q u i v a l e n tt ot h ee v e n tt h a tb i d d e r1 has signal x and the m-th highest
signal among all other bidders is greater than x, while the (m+1)-st highest signal is smaller
than x.
We ﬁrst look at the price sequences. Let Pa
t and Pn
t be the price in round t of a sequential










With winning-bids announcement, conditional on knowing the realization pa
1 of Pa
1,t h ee x -
pected price in the second round is higher than pa
1; similarly, with no bid announcement,
conditional on knowing the realization pn
1 of Pn
1 , the expected second-round price is higher
than pn
1. Prices drift upward. Milgrom and Weber (2000) were the ﬁrst to report this result
for their conjectured equilibrium with no bid announcement and one object sold in each
round. Here we extend the result to the case of winning-bids announcement.4
Theorem 3. In a sequential uniform auction with or without winning-bids announcement,
the expected second-round price conditional on the realized ﬁrst-round price is higher than the
realized ﬁrst-round price: E [Pa
2|pa
1] ≥ pa




Proof. Consider the case of winning-bids announcement. By Theorem 2, the realized price
in the ﬁrst round is given by pa
1 = ba
1(zk1+1),w h e r ezk1+1 is the realized value of Zk1+1,t h e
(k1 +1 ) - s th i g h e s to u to fn signals. Thus, conditioning on pa
1 is the same as conditioning on
Zk1+1 = zk1+1. The price in the second round is Pa
2 = ba
2(Zk+1;Z1,...,Zk1). Since conditioning
on the event {Zk1+1 = zk1+1} is equivalent to conditioning on the event {Y k1 ≥ X1 = zk1+1 ≥
































where the inequality follows from aﬃliation.
4The result easily extends to the case of multiple rounds.
18The proof of the no bid announcement case is analogous. Letting pn
1 = bn
























Theorem 3 has an important implication. The expected, unconditional, price (i.e., the
price expected by the seller) in the second round is higher than the expected, unconditional,
price in the ﬁrst round. Therefore, in the single-round uniform auction the seller’s expected
revenue is always higher than in the sequential uniform auction with no bid announcement.
Theorem 4. The seller’s expected revenue in a sequential uniform auction with no bid
announcement is lower than in a single-round uniform auction for k objects.5
Proof. The second round bidding function bn
2(x), given by (3), is the same as the bidding
function in a single-round auction bs(x), given by (2). Therefore, the expected second-round
price in the sequential auction is the same as the expected price in the single-round auction.
By Theorem 3, the expected price in the ﬁrst round of a sequential auction is lower than
the expected price in the second round. Thus expected revenue in the sequential auction is
lower.
The second-round bid function in a sequential auction with no bid announcement and
the bid function in the single-round auction coincide. Thus, auctioning objects in sequence
yields no gain in second-round revenue when the winning bids are not announced. Auctioning
objects in sequence, however, has a cost to the seller, because it induces bidders to lowball
in the ﬁrst round. Let Ps = bs(Zk+1) be the price in a single-round auction for k objects,
and deﬁne the lowballing eﬀect on revenue, L,a st h ed i ﬀerence between the expected price
in the ﬁrst round of a sequential auction with no bid announcement and the expected price
in a single-round auction:
L = E [P
n
1 ] − E [P
s].
5Surprisingly, even though they noticed that the price sequence is upward drifting, Milgrom and Weber
(2000, p.193) conjectured that the sequential auction with no bid announcement yields greater revenue than
the single-round uniform auction.
19By Theorem 3, L is negative. To better understand the lowballing eﬀect, suppose zk1+1
is the signal realization of the price setter in the ﬁrst round of a sequential auction with no
bid announcement. Equilibrium requires that, conditional on being tied with (i.e., having
t h es a m es i g n a la s )t h eﬁrst-round price setter, a bidder (say bidder 1)i si n d i ﬀerent between



























However, since ties have zero probability, the ﬁrst-round price setter pays a lower price than
































Aﬃliation is crucial for this result. With private values (e.g., a bidder’s value for one
object coincides with his signal) and independent signals, the price sequence is a martingale
and revenue in the single-round and the sequential uniform auctions coincide (see Milgrom
and Weber, 2000, Weber, 1983). On the other hand, if values are private but aﬃliated, then
t h ep r i c es e q u e n c ei si n c r e a s i n g .
In the second round of a sequential auction with aﬃliated private values, a bidder bids
his own value; that is, the second-round bid coincides with the bid in a single-round uniform
auction, irrespective of whether the ﬁrst-round winning bids are revealed. The ﬁrst-round
bidding functions also do not depend on the information policy. This has the important
implication that with aﬃliated private values auctioning the objects in a single round yields
the seller higher revenue independently of the information policy that he follows.
20Theorem 5. With aﬃliated private values, the seller’s expected revenue in a sequential
uniform auction with winning-bids announcement is the same as in a sequential uniform
auction with no bid announcement and is lower than in a single-round uniform auction for
k objects.
The next result shows that, in the general aﬃl i a t e dm o d e l ,w h e nt h eﬁrst-round winning
bids are announced, there is a positive informational eﬀect on second-round bids.
Theorem 6. In the sequential auction with winning-bids announcement the expected second-
round price is higher than the expected price in a single-round auction for k objects.
Proof. Let zk+1 be the realization of the (k +1 ) -st highest signal among all n bidders.







Conditioning on {Zk+1 = zk+1} is equivalent to conditioning on {X1 ≥ Y k = zk+1}.T h u s ,t h e
expected price in the second round of the sequential auction with winning-bids announcement,

























where the inequality follows from aﬃliation. Taking expectations over Zk+1 concludes the
proof.
Deﬁne the second-round informational eﬀect on revenue, Ia
2,a st h ed i ﬀerence between the




2 = E [P
a




2] − E [P
s].
21By Theorem 6, this informational eﬀect is positive (it is zero in the aﬃliated private values
model) and can be understood in light of the linkage principle ﬁrst analyzed by Milgrom and
Weber (1982): public revelation of a random variable aﬃliated with bidders’s signals raises
expected bids and the seller’s expected revenue in a single-round auction. Here the revealed
random variables are the winning bids in the ﬁrst round (i.e., the k1 highest signals among
all bidders). Such a revelation raises the expected second-round price. A caveat is in order,
h o w e v e r . T h ef a c tt h a tt h eﬁrst-round winning bids will be revealed also has an eﬀect on
ﬁrst-round bids. Deﬁne the ﬁrst-round informational eﬀect on revenue, Ia
1, as the diﬀerence




1 = E [P
a
1] − E [P
n
1 ].
Then, the diﬀerence between the expected price in the ﬁrst round of a sequential auction
with winning-bids announcement and the expected price in a single-round auction can be
viewed as the sum of the lowballing eﬀect and the ﬁrst-round informational eﬀect
E [P
a




The policy of revealing the winning bids has a complicated eﬀect on ﬁrst-round bidding.
As demonstrated by the numerical example below, the ﬁrst-round informational eﬀect can
be either positive or negative (by Theorem 5, Ia
1 =0in the aﬃliated private values model).
When it is positive, Ia
1 could be greater or smaller than −L. As a result, all rankings of the
expected ﬁrst-round prices in the auctions with and without winning-bids announcement are
possible.
First, the ﬁrst-round expected price in a sequential auction with winning-bids announce-
ment can be lower than the expected ﬁrst-round price in a sequential auction with no bid
announcement. Second, the ﬁrst-round expected price can be higher than the expected price
in a sequential auction with no bid announcement, but lower than the expected price in a
single-round auction. In these cases, the revenue comparison between a single-round auc-
22tion and a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement is ambiguous. Which of the
two auction formats yields greater revenue depends on the model parameters. Finally, the
expected ﬁrst-round price in a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement can be
higher than the expected price in a single-round auction. In this case, revenue is higher in
the sequential auction.
These ﬁndings allow us to gain some insights on the comparison between other auction
formats and the sequential uniform auction with winning-bids announcement. We know
from Milgrom and Weber (1982, 2000) that the ascending (English) auction raises the highest
revenue among standard single-round auctions. Note that the single-round ascending auction
is equivalent to the single-round uniform auction when there are only three bidders for two
objects. Thus, we can conclude that for some model parameters the sequential uniform-price
auction with winning-bids announcement raises greater revenue than any standard single-
round auction, while for other parameters the ascending auction yields higher revenue.6
An additional question, that we do not address in this paper, concerns the optimal seller’s
choice of how many objects to auction in each round of a sequential auction with winning-
bids announcement. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no general answer:
the optimal mix of k1 and k2 depends on the model parameters.
5.1 A Numerical Example
We now present the numerical example that shows that revenue and ﬁrst-round price com-
parisons are ambiguous. The example is constructed to make the numerical calculations as
simple as possible, not to be realistic. We assume that there are three bidders, two objects,
each bidder has the same value for one object, and that each bidder’s signal is a conditionally
independent estimate of this common value. This is a special case of our model in which
n =3 , k1 = k2 =1 , u(V,X1,X 2,X 3)=V ,a n de a c hXi, i =1 ,2,3, is independently drawn
from a conditional density f(x|v). The common value has a discrete distribution: its value
6When it raises greater revenue than a single-round ascending auction, the sequential uniform auction
with winning-bids announcement also raises greater revenue than a sequential ascending auction because, as























Figure 1: Prices as functions of the parameter α.






















where α ∈ [−2,2].7
Figure 1 plots the expected prices E [Pn
1 ], E [Pn
2 ], E [Pa
1],a n dE [Pa
2] as functions of α.
(Appendix B contains the relevant formulas.) Recall that, by (2) and (3), E [Pn
2 ] is equal to
E [Ps]. The following conclusions can be drawn from the ﬁgure.
First, by Theorem 3, E [Pn
1 ] is always less than E [Pn
2 ],a n dE [Pa
1] is always less than
E [Pa
2].S e c o n d , b y T h e o r e m 6 , E [Pa
2] is always higher than E [Pn
2 ].T h i r d , E [Pa
1] may
7In such a case, the aﬃliation property can be written as f(x|v)f(x0|v0) ≥ f(x|v0)f(x0|v) for all x,x0,v,v0
such that x ≥ x0 and v ≥ v0. The signal distribution (20) satisﬁes the aﬃliation property (1). Note that,
although we have assumed that all random variables are continuous, all our results extend to the common-














Figure 2: Revenues as functions of the parameter α.
b es m a l l e ro rg r e a t e rt h a nE [Pn
1 ], depending on whether α is smaller or greater than 0.25.
Fourth, E [Pa
1] may be smaller or greater than E [Pn
2 ], depending on whether α is smaller or
greater than 0.85.
Figure 2 plots expected auction revenues for the sequential auction with no bid announce-
ment, E [Rn], the sequential auction with winning-bids announcement, E [Ra], and the single-
round auction for two objects, E [Rs]. As we know from Theorem 4, the expected revenue
of a sequential auction with no bid announcement is always lower than the expected revenue
of a single-round auction. Figure 2 shows that the expected revenue of a sequential auction
with winning-bids announcement may be smaller or greater than the expected revenue of a
single-round auction, depending on whether α is smaller or greater than zero.8
8In our example, for all values of α, expected revenue in a sequential auction is higher with winning-bids
announcement than with no bid announcement. In other words, even though Ia
1 may be negative, Ia
1 + Ia
2
turns out to be positive. We have obtained the same result in all other numerical examples we have tried,
but we have not been able to provide a formal proof.
255.2 Intermediate Information Policies
We now study the policy of revealing only the lowest ﬁrst-round winning bid. Such a policy
can be viewed as an approximation of the policy of announcing the winning price (the larger
the number of bidders, the better the approximation).9 At the end of this subsection we will
also discuss other intermediate information policies.
Let b`
t(·) be the bidding function in round t =1 ,2 of a sequential auction with lowest-
winning-bid announcement. The proof of the following theorem is analogous to the proof of
Theorem 2.
Theorem 7. Let yk1 be the realization of the signal that correspond to the lowest ﬁrst-round
winning bid. A symmetric equilibrium strategy in the sequential uniform auction with lowest-

























From the seller’s point of view, the policy of only announcing the lowest ﬁrst-round
winning bid is dominated by the policy of revealing all winning bids.
Theorem 8. In a sequential uniform auction with lowest-winning-bid announcement the
expected prices in both rounds are lower than in a sequential uniform auction with winning-
bids announcement.
Proof. Deﬁne the random variable P`
t as the price in round t of a sequential auction with
9Announcing the winning price is common in practice. Unfortunately, analyzing such a policy requires
dealing with a host of additional technical issues. In the second round, the bid of one of the remaining bidders
becomes publicly known. This destroys the symmetry of second-round bidding; see also Milgrom and Weber
(2000, pp.181-182).






k1 = zk1,X 1 = Y
k = zk+1] (21)





k1 = zk1,X 1 = Y
k = zk+1]
= E[V1|Y




The expected second-round price of the sequential auction with winning-bids announce-































where the inequality follows from aﬃliation and the ﬁrst equality in the last line follows from
(21). Taking expectations over Zk1 and Zk+1 shows that the expected second-round price is
higher when all ﬁrst-round winning bids are announced than when only the lowest winning
bid is announced.
The expected ﬁrst-round price of the sequential auction with winning-bids announcement,
















































where the inequality follows from aﬃliation and the equality in the second to last line follows
27from (21). Taking expectations over Zk1+1 concludes the proof.
Theorems 7 and 8 can be generalized to other intermediate revelation policies that in-
clude revealing the lowest ﬁrst-round winning bid. The proof of existence of a symmetric
equilibrium is analogous to the proof of Theorem 2 and easily extends to multiple rounds.10
The proof that each of these policies yields a lower expected price in both rounds than the
policy of revealing all winning bids is similar to the proof of Theorem 8.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We have derived the symmetric equilibrium bidding functions for the sequential uniform
auction with and without winning-bids announcement, and we have isolated three eﬀects on
revenue of auctioning objects sequentially, rather than simultaneously: a lowballing eﬀect
and two informational eﬀects. The lowballing eﬀect reduces bids in the ﬁrst round. When
there are no bid announcements (or values are private), only the lowballing eﬀe c ti sa tw o r k
and the ﬁrst-round expected price and the seller’s revenue are lower than in a single-round
auction. When the ﬁrst-round winning bids are announced, the second-round informational
eﬀect raises the expected second-round price above the price in a single-round auction. On
the other hand, the ﬁrst-round informational eﬀect has an ambiguous impact on ﬁrst-round
expected price. The ﬁrst-round expected price with winning-bids announcement can range
from being lower than with no bid announcement to being higher than the expected price
in a single-round auction. As a result, the revenue comparison of a single-round uniform
auction and a sequential auction with winning-bids announcement is also ambiguous; either
could be higher.
10Revealing the lowest winning bid in each round alleviates the diﬃculty mentioned by Milgrom and
Weber (2000, p.182) of proving that bidding higher, to have better information in subsequent rounds, is not
proﬁtable.
28Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we consider the case where D(s) is a polynomial so that it has
a ﬁnite number of zeros. After proving the lemma for that case, we generalize the result to
any continuous function D(s).
Fix z, 0 <z≤ S, set s0 =0 ,a n dl e ts1 <s 2 < ···<s M−1 be the zeros of D(s) which are
not local extrema and which are smaller than sM = z.N o t et h a tD(s0) ≤ 0,s i n c eo t h e r w i s e
R x
0 D(s)a(s)ds > 0 for small enough x.I fM is even, let 2N = M. By construction, D(s) ≤ 0
for s2i ≤ s ≤ s2i+1 and D(s) ≥ 0 for s2i+1 ≤ s ≤ s2i+2,w i t hi =0 ,1,...,N−1.I fM is odd, let





We will prove that
R x
0 D(s)a(s)ds ≤ 0 for all x implies that
R s2N
0 D(s)ds ≤ 0.
Since a(s) is positive and non-decreasing,
R s2i+1
s2i D(s)a(s)ds ≥ a(s2i+1)
R s2i+1
s2i D(s)ds,a n d
R s2i+2
s2i+1 D(s)a(s)ds ≥ a(s2i+1)
R s2i+2




































Note that (22) implies
R s2N
0 D(s)ds ≤ 1
a(s2N−1)
R s2N
0 D(s)a(s)ds ≤ 0; that is, if (22) holds then
the lemma, under the assumption that D(s) is a polynomial, is proven. The proof of (22)
















































The ﬁrst inequality follows from the induction assumption. The last inequality follows from
R s2K
0 D(s)a(s)ds ≤ 0 and a(s) being positive and increasing, which hold by the lemma’s
assumptions. This shows that (22) holds and completes the proof of the lemma when D(s)
is a polynomial.
Now suppose that D(s) is any continuous function on [0,S]. By Weierstrass Approx-
imation Theorem, for any ε > 0 there exists a polynomial Pm of degree m such that
|D(s) − Pm(s)| < ε for all s in [0,S].D e ﬁne the polynomial Dm(s)=Pm(s) − ε,s ot h a t




0 D(s)a(s)ds ≤ 0. Furthermore, there exists a sequence of polynomials Dm such that





We have already shown that the lemma holds for all polynomial functions Dm:f o ra n yx,
R x
0 Dm(s)ds ≤ 0 for all m.A sar e s u l t ,
R x
0 D(s)ds = limm→∞
R x
0 Dm(s)ds ≤ 0, and the lemma
holds for any continuous function D(s).
30Appendix B
This appendix presents the detailed derivation of the formulas used for drawing Figure 1 and
Figure 2.
It is convenient to work with a slightly more general example than the one in Section 5.1.
There are n bidders and two objects. The common value is either v1 or v2, with probabilities





2+α(2x − 2v − s2 + s1)
2(s1 + s2)
0
if x ∈ [v − s1,v+ s2],







,a n dv2 − s1 ≤ v1 <v 2 ≤ v1 + s2 (Figures 1 and 2 assume n =3 ,
q1 = q2 = s1 = s2 =0 .5). Let φ(s)=





T h ej o i n tp d fo fb i d d e r1’s signal x, the highest y1, and second-highest y2 signals of bidders





(n − 1)(n − 2)f(x|v)f(y1|v)f(y2|v)Fn−3(y2|v)
0
if y2 ≤ y1,
if y2 >y 1.
(23)
First, consider the no-bid-announcement case.
















   
   
v1 if x<v 2 − s1
bn
21(x) if v2 − s1 ≤ x ≤ v1 + s2






2(x − v1)Φn−3(x − v1)(1− Φ(x − v1)) + q2v2φ
2(x − v2)Φn−3(x − v2)(1− Φ(x − v2))
q1φ
2(x − v1)Φn−3(x − v1)(1− Φ(x − v1)) + q2φ




n(n − 1)(n − 2)
2
φ(x − v)Φ
n−3(x − v)(1 − Φ(x − v))
2.





























φ2(x,y2|v)=( n − 2)φ
2(x − v)φ(y2 − v)Φ
n−3(y2 − v). (24)


















   
   
v1 if x<v 2 − s1
bn
11(x) if v2 − s1 ≤ x ≤ v1 + s2
bn















2(x − v1)Φn−2(x − v1)+q2φ







21(y2)φ(y2 − v2)Φn−3(y2 − v2)dy2 + v2
R x




φ1(x|v)=n(n − 1)φ(x − v)Φ
n−2(x − v)(1 − Φ(x − v)). (25)


























Now, consider the winning-bids-announcement case.








   
   
v1 if x<v 2 − s1
ba
21(x,y1) if v2 − s1 ≤ x ≤ y1 ≤ v1 + s2






2(x − v1)Φn−3(x − v1)φ(y1 − v1)+q2v2φ
2(x − v2)Φn−3(x − v2)φ(y1 − v2)
q1φ
2(x − v1)Φn−3(x − v1)φ(y1 − v1)+q2φ
2(x − v2)Φn−3(x − v2)φ(y1 − v2)
.
Let
φ3(x,y1|v)=n(n − 1)(n − 2)φ(x − v)φ(y1 − v)Φ
n−3(x − v)[Φ(y1 − v) − Φ(x − v)].




















































   
   
v1 if x<v 2 − s1
ba
11(x) if v2 − s1 ≤ x ≤ v1 + s2
v2 if v1 + s2 <x ,














2(x − v1)Φn−2(x − v1)+q2φ
2(x − v2)Φn−2(x − v2)
.
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